소유지배구조와 사업다각화가 이익조정에 미치는 영향

This paper empirically investigates ownership-control structure and diversification effects on earnings management using Korean non-financial firms listed in KOSPI over 2001-2008. In this paper, wedge is proxy for the ownership-control structure and discretionary accrual estimated from modified Jones model(1995) is used as a proxy for the earnings management. In many prior studies, the results have showed that from point of ownership-control view, as wedge increases, private profit of manager is reinforced and manager's earnings management is activated. Also the results provide the evidence that from point of agency theory view, the diversification leads manager to enlarge the firm size and in turn, managers strengthen their self-interest. Also prior papers have documented that manager could build up their empire building and seek their private interest. Our empirical test provides the following results. First, wedge affects positively significant impact to earnings management, implying that manager in bad ownership structure adjusts the earnings management more frequently. Second, the diversification does not have effect on the earnings management. However, the diversification in firm with bad ownership structure has positively significant impact on the earnings management, suggesting that the firms with worst ownership structure make the earnings management frequently. Third, wedge affects positive and significant impact to the earnings management in the group with more diversification whereas there is negative and significant effect in the group with less diversification. As a result, our empirical result implies that the association between wedge and earngins management depends on the extent of diversification.