Multilateral Nuclear Export Controls and NPT

There are three different categories of nuclear controls that have been carried out in the subsequent practice of NPT: sensitive nuclear activities, dual-use items, and conventional nuclear items. Sensitive nuclear activities cover technology, facilities, and materials in uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing,and heavy water manufacturing that may directly contribute to the nuclear explosive capacity. Control on sensitive nuclear activities caused the trans-pacific dispute between the U.S. and Japan on Japan's indigenous nuclear recycling program. It also causes a trans-Atlantic fight on the sensitive export from advanced European countries (France and West Germany) to developing countries. Control on dual-use items and conventional nuclear items were promoted by the supplier states after the end of the cold war, it incurred aversion from the developing countries of NPT Party States. “Sensitive nuclear activity”appears nowhere in the two basic legal documents of NPR–Statute of the International Atomic Agency as well as the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This notion was articulated in the U.S. new nonproliferation policy, which was forged by Ford and Carter Administration. However, the activities of uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, and heavy water manufacturing, on the other hand,are“sensitive”political issues since they had been so far legitimate activities in peaceful use of nuclear energy Control on sensitive nuclear activities is primarily a matter of domestic control on national nuclear exports. Not limited to the direct control on sensitive exports,the U.S. controls on sensitive nuclear activities have extended to the territory of recipient countries by adding conditions on conventional nuclear exports from the United States. In this case, the United States reserves residual rights on the exported nuclear material as well as facilities – the rights are taken as“prior consent rights”of the United States. This prior consent rights had appeared ad hoc in bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements between the U.S. and the recipient states. The difference on what the degree of“restraint”should be in controlling sensitive nuclear exports has resulted in a major diplomatic issue between the U.S. on the one side and France and West Germany on the other side in the mid-1970s. This even triggered the establishment of Nuclear Suppliers Group and the making of a non-binding multilateral agreement (London Guidelines Part One)in coordinating nuclear exports. In July 1991, Iraq admitted to UN Security Council that it had been working on clandestine programs to enrich uranium. The main technology used in Iraqi clandestine uranium enrichments was the electromagnetic separation (Calutron). The scope of sensitive nuclear activities may no longer be limited to activities in fuel cycle. The 1978 - published London Guidelines did not cover the items Iraqi acquired in its clandestine uranium enrichment program. This became a major impetus for the NSG to develop Dual-Use Guidelines – published as London Guidelines Part 2 in March 1992. Controls on nuclear activities started from defining“sensitive nuclear activities”and now controls have been extended to dual-use items as well as other conventional EDP items essential for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. These events led to a regulating regime with developed, regulating states on one side and developing, regulated states on the other side. The expansion of multilateral nuclear controls redrew the map of nuclear nonproliferation world.