지배구조가 투자에 미치는 영향 : 과대 및 과소 투자기업을 중심으로

This paper empirically examines the importance of investor protection by evaluating the effect of investor protection on corporate risk taking for groups of overinvestment and underinvestment firms. We also investigate the impact of risk taking on firm value to verify the validity of investor protection effect on risk taking for the groups of overinvestment and underinvestment firms. Our empirical findings show that better investor protection leads to lower investment risk and the firm value decreases as investment risk increases for the group of overinvestment firms. It suggests that better investor protection can mitigate the overinvestment problem induced by agency problems in companies with limited growth opportunities and large cash flows. On the other hand, better investor protection leads to higher investment risk and the firm value increases as investment risk rises for the group of underinvestment firms. It indicates that better investor protection can mitigate the underinvestment problem induced by information asymmetry problems in companies with many growth opportunities and low cash flows. This study is significant in the sense that it confirms the importance of investor protection actively enhancing firm value in circumstances where firm characteristics become more diverse.