소유 및 지배구조가 경영자 스톡옵션 보상과 사적소비의 관련성에 미치는 영향

This study examines whether stock options awarded to top management executives have non-linear relations with managerial perquisite consumption. This study also tests moderating effects of the characteristics of ownership and corporate governance structure on the relationship between executive stock option and managerial perquisite consumption. We use 197 firm-year sample data of 55 non-financing firms with executive stock option from Korean listed companies for the period 1999-2005. The results of the study are as follows: First, we find that there exists the negative relationship between executive stock option and perquisite consumption, but the marginal effect of executive's stock option on perquisite consumption is diminishing. Second, in the cases when companies are professional management-controlled or ownership percentage of firms' majority shareholders is low, i.e., the probability of a relatively high level of agency costs between managers and shareholders exists, the effect of executive stock option awards on the reduction of perquisite consumption is larger. Third, the effect of the executive stock option on the reduction perquisite consumption is even higher when the ratio of outside directors to the board is low or the ownership percentage of foreign investors is low. And finally, the ownership percentage of institutional investors does not affect relationship between executive stock option and perquisite consumption.