글로벌 금융위기로 대두된 신용평가회사 이해상충 문제의 해결방안

Based on the belief that inaccurate and improper credit ratings of structured finance products resulted in the global financial crisis, the regulators of the United States and other major countries increased their monitoring and supervision of credit rating agencies. Since the real problem was not caused by the credit rating but the structuring process and risk management, we have to think about what the credit rating is, and what makes it necessary. In Korea, systemic efforts to prevent conflicts of interest, to promote competition and new methodologies, to introduce new symbols and systems of rating and so forth, have been taken and carried out to reform the credit rating agencies in line with the so-called global standards. In particular, the standard internal control standards have been implemented by the Financial Supervisory Service since January 2010, in which prevention of conflicts of interest, enhanced compliance, disclosure of credit rating process and results, and no more unfair activities are called for in a concrete manner. This paper examines the new regulations and supervision of credit rating agencies introduced by the United States, EU, Japan and the IOSCO. Some questions remain that Korea has to apply identical measures even though its background and economic circumstances are quite different from those of other countries. It seems to be necessary for the growth of Korean credit rating industry to discourage rating shopping rather than to reduce the reliance on external ratings. So as to solve the information asymmetry, double ratings in line with the aggregate amount of bond issues, nomination of credit rating agencies by rotation based upon their performances are strongly recommended. Take a precedent of the auditor rotation system which has been successfully implemented since 1997. This half-mandatory system has brought to halt the close relations between the auditors and audited companies, and ensured the independent auditing for at least three years. The author’s suggestion is summarized as follows:-To select a credit rating agency by rotation in case that the aggregate amount of bond issues exceed a certain amount;-To assess the rating performances including credit rating default ratios of the rated issuers during the past few years;-To take into consideration the agency's voluntary disclosure of information and cooperative attitude toward the regulators; and -To authorize the above-mentioned functions to the Securities and Futures Commission in the Financial Services Commission. Accordingly, credit rating agencies with good performances have more chances to do rating jobs. Sometimes, the “Issuer-Pays” model is believed to have something to do with conflicts of interest. However, the newly suggested “Government as Umpire” model does not care who pays for the rating service. Where double ratings are required for a sophisticated and large-amount bond issue, the issuer should nominate a different credit rating agency so that two agencies may observe the fair play rule in a competitive manner.