Impeachment as Legislative Oversight

The Constitution of South Korea empowers the National Assembly to put forward a motion for impeachment of public officials, including the president. Additionally, the Constitutional Court holds the power to review the motion and deliver the final decision. The National Assembly’s power of motion is based on one of the fundamental principles: checks and balances system of the Constitution. While the president holds the power to veto legislative bills, and while the judiciary holds the right to repeal legislation, the legislature has the right to oversee on administrative and judicial actions―including impeachment of officials with the help of the Constitutional Court. This triad of power distribution is what modern democracy has designed. However, as promulgated in the Constitution, this power must be controlled by the rule of law. Therefore the legislative oversight, including impeachment should be performed within the boundaries of the rule of law. Legislative oversight without consideration of the rule of law can only fail. The experience of 2004 presidential impeachment proves this statement. Even the National Assembly, which was established upon democracy, cannot be an exception of the rule of law. The fact that we did not have an organized structure of law relating to impeachment accounts for the failure. It caused a reckless disregard for the rule of law in the process of impeachment, which should have been more considered as a device for legislative oversight. Just as we have the separation of powers in the Constitution, all governmental branches should be in check with one another, so as to achieve balance of power. The constitutional ideals work according to the rule of law. Legislative oversight, as a practice of those ideals, should be made within the framework of the rule of law. So should impeachment be.