이해관계집단의 정치자금 기부에 관한 법적 고찰 : 미국의 제도와 비교하여

In various perspectives regarding participation of interest groups to the political process, the dominant theory is the civic republicanism which suggests political process as a deliberative process in pursuit of public interest between members of society represented by interest group. The regulation on an interest group's participation to the political process is based on the anti-corruption purpose to prevent pursuing of private or group's interest by political representatives that betrays public confidences. The regulation is more needed in civic republicanism perspective than other. This article deals the regulation of political contribution- the most controversial aspect in interest group participation- based on the comparative analysis between Korea and U.S. which adopts opposing regulation. In historical difference, U.S. regulation on political contribution of interest group has evolved based on the different treatment between contribution and expenditure through the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Buckley v. Valeo opinion, Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 which all constitute cornerstone of campaign Finance regulation. In Korea, 2004 amendment of Political Fund Act transformed the goal of regulation from legalizing illegal slush money through political parties to vitalizing small donation to the candidates directly. Substantive regulation of it has some common and different aspects between two countries. Two country shares prohibition of quid pro quo money or large donation, direct donation from own property of corporation and labor unions, enhanced regulation against election period expenditure and the base of regulation is very similar in pursuing anti-corruption. But Korea and U.S. show critical contrast against contribution of other entities except corporation and labor unions, collective donation from entity members and donation facilitating act-so called "bundling". This article articulates the basic difference of statutes and court's attitude toward it. Lastly, this article deals disclosure of campaign finance which regulate political donation indirectly. U.S. adopts pre-election disclosure and real time internet based access to the disclosed data, but Korea shows half-hearted attitude though two countries adopt some kind of full disclosure model. Reason may be found on the fact that disclosure of campaign finance has some positive and negative effects including retaliation at the same time. This stark contrast between two countries is originated from ideological difference surrounding the inequality between interest group based on social wealth, fund raising practice and adoption of public funding in election, tolerance of clientelism. Therefore the contrast may be remain in the short future. However, the current regulation in Korea based on general prohibition against interest group's participation in the fund raising of campaign finance and weak disclosure has produced significant problems: politician's deep dependence to the quid pro money and illegal participation of interest group in fund raising. The reform should be focused to allowing collective donation from interest group members and facilitating acts by associations. The parallel reform of disclosure based on strengthened reporting requirement and public access is also needed to prevent potential corruption concern.