‘반 대통령제’ 개헌론 재고(再考): 제도적－행태적 비교연구에 근거한 비판적 헌법정책론

In August 2009, the Parliamentary Advisory Committee of Constitutional Revision proposed adopting the French-style semi-presidential system of government. But the revision proposal is not so persuasive as they maintain, for it does not reflect a number of recent studies about semi-presidentialism. This paper deals with some important research issues of semi-presidentialism, not only in comparative-institutional analyses but also in empirical-behavioral studies. First, I examine different concepts and types of semi-presidentialism. Here, the works of M. Duverger, G. Sartori, M. S. Shugart, and R. Elgie will be reviewed. Second, I examine the merits and demerits, the wins and losses of semi-presidentialism. The statistics of recent positive studies, especially the broad comparative work of S. Moestrup, show that the theoretical advantages of semi-presidentialism are not convincing, with few exceptions in Eastern Europe. Third, I examine institutional and behavioral factors that influence the performance of semi-presidential systems. A number of positive studies reveal the fact that an unstable party system and a powerful presidency tend to cause the failure of a semi-presidential government. After considering the above mentioned factors, I finally make a pessimistic prediction about the effect of the revision proposal: “The vicious combination of a weak party system and a strong presidency in Korean ‘real’ politics may lead to the failure of a new semi-presidential government.”