미국식 워런트제도의 도입-그 성공가능성에 대한 비판적 평가

In the U.S., a warrant gives its holder the right to buy a predetermined share at a price somewhat lower than the current market price of the outstanding shares at a specified future date. The U.S. version of a warrant is usually issued by the board of directors and can trade on the exchange like ordinary shares. A U.S.-style warrant can be exercised at any time by a predetermined date. When a corporation wants to raise money, it will issue warrants. A warrant is often attached to new debt or preferred shares to make the debt or shares more attactive and thus functions as a sweetener. Since the attempt to introduce a poison pill scheme as a defensive measure against hostile M&A's into Korea is an hot-debated issue, some proposals have been submitted that a warrant which is a way to a corporation to raise more funds and use a defensive tactic in a emergent period should be permitted by revising the Commercial Code. This study assess the possibility of success in Korea's borrowing of a U.S. version of a warrant in perspectives of theories of Professors Kahn-Freund and Watson. The result of this study is that the U.S. version of a warrant cannot be a model for Korean legislation because the reception of U.S.-style warrant will meet the strong resistance from the people.