이윤압착의 규제 필요성과 위법성 판단기준
Antitrust Analysis of a Margin Squeeze
김현수(정보통신정책연구원)
25권 2호, 189~216쪽
초록
A margin squeeze is the market conduct which frequently occurs in the network industries a vertically integrated firm exists. It is not a independent abuse but a kind of refusal to deal. Most of recent margin squeezes have occurred in the context that market dominant undertakings tried to avoid regulatory duty to supply, which constitute de facto refusal to deal. Thus antitrust analysis of margin squeeze should be done through the two-step process. First, there should be antitrust duty to deal. It is not always recognized even if regulatory duty to supply exists, and it is not always denied though regulatory duty to supply doesn't exist. Eventually it's the problem to be resolved by the established doctrine on refusal to deal. Secondly, if duty to deal is recognized, we must decide whether a spread between wholesale and retail prices is sufficient. The assessment should be based on the dominant firm's costs and prices, and in the dynamic telecommunications industry it's desirable to use LRAIC and DCF from a long-term perspective.
Abstract
A margin squeeze is the market conduct which frequently occurs in the network industries a vertically integrated firm exists. It is not a independent abuse but a kind of refusal to deal. Most of recent margin squeezes have occurred in the context that market dominant undertakings tried to avoid regulatory duty to supply, which constitute de facto refusal to deal. Thus antitrust analysis of margin squeeze should be done through the two-step process. First, there should be antitrust duty to deal. It is not always recognized even if regulatory duty to supply exists, and it is not always denied though regulatory duty to supply doesn't exist. Eventually it's the problem to be resolved by the established doctrine on refusal to deal. Secondly, if duty to deal is recognized, we must decide whether a spread between wholesale and retail prices is sufficient. The assessment should be based on the dominant firm's costs and prices, and in the dynamic telecommunications industry it's desirable to use LRAIC and DCF from a long-term perspective.
- 발행기관:
- 한국기업법학회
- 분류:
- 법학