혼합보수와 쌍방대리인 콘테스트

While existing literature of delegated contests assumes that delegates' effort level is controlled by contingent fees, we turn this proposition into a null hypothesis and test it. For this we set up a bilateral-delegation contest model, where contingent fees are a portion of prize and fixed fees payable for hours worked. We explore, in a two-stage game, how delegates’ compensation schemes are affected by the optimization strategies of clients and delegates. Results are as follows. First, whether contingent fees can control delegates' effort level depends on the interrelationship of prize, contingent fees and reservation fees, thus rejecting the null hypothesis. Second, delegates' effort level is found controllable under limited circumstances. With this as a watershed, cases are halved into a zone where insufficient effort level indeed takes place and the other where delegates end up working more hours than solicited. Third, delegates' effort level decreases as a result of increasing prize and decreasing reservation fees.