실물이익조정의 행태와 차기 성과와의 관련성

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether managers conduct real earnings management when the earnings do not meet the target earnings number. We hypothesize that managers would manipulate earnings numbers with real activities. Also, this paper analyses the difference of effective tax rates between the sample that do not meet the target earnings and the sample that meet the target earnings. And we study the effect of real earnings management on the future performance of the firms. This paper measures the real earnings management using the method of Roychowdhury(2006). This paper finds as follows. First, this paper finds evidence that managers would manipulate earnings numbers with real activities with abnormal operating cash flows and abnormal discretionary expense being consistent with the hypothesis. Second, there is no evidence of difference of effective tax rates between the sample that do not meet the target earnings and the sample that do not. Third, we find that, even in the real earnings management firms, the effect of real earnings management on the future performance of the firms. is negative. This paper’s results add a kind of contribution to the prior research. This paper presents evidence that the firms that do not meet the target earnings use real earnings management activities to arrive at the target. This paper also presents evidence the negative effect of real earnings management on the future performance of the firms.