우리나라 중앙은행의 독립성 구현을 위한 바람직한 조직 형태

In modern capitalistic nation, the independence of central bank is regarded as a indispensible factor for the stabilization of currency value and financial system, and sound growth of the national economy. But previous studies have focused on the empirical view of economic science, and have the limitation not to consider the institutional form of central bank as a subject of national economic administration. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the independence of central bank from the perspective of constitutional and administrative law. This thesis derives the normative request for the central bank's independence from constitutional principles such as the principle of separation of the powers and the democratic principle, and extracts the ideal form to realize the central bank's independence by comparative studies and the adaptation of administrative law's theories. When discussions on the reorganization of central bank take place in Korea in the future, I really hope that this paper will be a useful reference material. The first chapter of this thesis deals with the purpose and scope of this study. The second chapter considers the definition and functions of central bank. In the third chapter, I investigate the definition of central bank's independence and the past pros and corns of discussions on the independence. In the fourth chapter, I derives the normative request for the central bank's independence by harmonizing constitutional principles such as the principle of separation of the powers and the democratic principle. The fifth chapter draws the ideal type to come true the central bank's independence by comparative studies and the adaptation of administrative law's theories. The sixth chapter forms a conclusions of this thesis. In this paper, I extract twelve types of the central bank's independence through combinations of three variables which are the legal basis, the position, and the legal characteristic of the institution. Among them, the constitutional public establishment to be independent from the government is concluded as the ideal institutional form of the Bank of Korea for realizing independence of the Bank.