특수관계자 거래가 재무분석가 예측에 미치는 영향
The Effect of Related Party Transactions on Analyst Forecast Errors
고윤성(한국외국어대학교); 유혜영(연세대학교); 이명건(연세대학교)
40권 5호, 1139~1161쪽
초록
특수관계자 거래는 특수관계자가 거래 상대방의 의사결정에 영향력을 행사할 수 있기 때문에 공정한 조건으로 이루어지지않을 가능성이 높다. 또한 이러한 거래는 특수관계가 없었더라면 성립되지 않거나 다른 조건으로 이루어질 가능성이 있다. 이에 정책당국에서는 기업회계기준서 20호를 통해 특수관계자와 특수관계자 거래에 대한 공시를 재무제표 주석사항으로 요구하고 있으며, 회계감사기준에도 별도의 감사절차를 마련해 두고 있다. 이와 같이 규제당국에서는 특수관계자 거래가 정보이용자들이 재무제표를 분석하는데 있어 도움을 주는 목적적합한 정보라고 정의하고, 주석으로 기재하도록 의무화하였다. 그러나 재무제표에는 특수관계자 거래 금액만이 주석으로 공시되고있기 때문에 외부이용자는 그 내용을 상세히 파악하기 어려우며, 기업과 정보이용자간에 정보비대칭이 존재할 가능성이높다. 이에, 본 연구는 특수관계자 거래가 정보비대칭에 미치는 영향을 효율적인 외부정보이용자인 재무분석가의 예측오차를 통해 검증하고자 하였다. 한편, 외국인 주주는 대리인 문제로 인한 정보비대칭에 대하여 효율적인 감시자 역할을 할 수 있다. 따라서 외국인 주주의 비중이 높을수록 특수관계자 거래로 인한 정보비대칭이 줄어들 것이다. 또한, 수출비중이 높은 기업일수록 거래의 분석이 복잡하여 외부이용자가 그 내용을 파악하기 어려울 것이다. 이에, 본 연구는 수출비중에 따라 특수관계자 거래가 재무분석가의 예측오차에 미치는 영향에 차이가 나타나는가를 추가분석으로 살펴보았다. 실증분석 결과, 특수관계자 거래가 많은 기업일수록 재무분석가 예측오차가 커지는 것으로 나타나 특수관계자 거래의 규모가 클수록 정보비대칭이 심해지는 것을 확인하였다. 또한 외국인주주의 비중이 높을수록 특수관계자 거래가 재무분석가예측오차에 미치는 영향이 작은 것으로 나타났다. 이를 통해, 정보비대칭의 정도가 외부감시자인 외국인주주에 의해 줄어듦을 알 수 있었다. 추가로, 수출비중이 높은 기업일수록 재무분석가 예측오차가 커지는 것으로 나타났는데, 이는 특수관계자 거래의 특성에 따라 재무분석가 예측오차에 미치는 영향이 달라질 수 있음을 의미한다.
Abstract
Related party transaction means a business deal or arrangement between two parties who are joined by a special relationship prior to the deal. Related party transactions are usually created in Asian countries where management and ownership aren't separated. Because one party has power to influence another, it is possible unfair related party transactions could be processed. If there weren't a special relationship, these transactions might not happen or be processed on different conditions. Therefore regulators request firms to disclose related party transactions as financial statement footnotes, establish audit regulations regarding related party transactions. Prior studies have generally reported private firm owners pursue private profits and reduce tax expenses through related party transactions. The disclosure of related party transactions is suit investors' purpose in analyzing financial statement. However because only the amount for related party transactions is disclosed, outside investors can't figure out the content of transactions clearly and information asymmetry gets bigger. In this study, we examine the effect of related party transactions on information asymmetry. Because analysts are referred to as efficient users using firm-level data to develop a more accurate estimate of firm value, we use analyst forecast errors as a proxy for information asymmetry. In addition, we measure information asymmetry in the firms with a large proportion of foreign ownership. In the previous studies, foreign shareholders are considered as efficient observers. As foreign ownership increases, information asymmetry caused by related party transactions Related party transaction means a business deal or arrangement between two parties who are joined by a special relationship prior to the deal. Related party transactions are usually created in Asian countries where management and ownership aren't separated. Because one party has power to influence another, it is possible unfair related party transactions could be processed. If there weren't a special relationship, these transactions might not happen or be processed on different conditions. Therefore regulators request firms to disclose related party transactions as financial statement footnotes, establish audit regulations regarding related party transactions. Prior studies have generally reported private firm owners pursue private profits and reduce tax expenses through related party transactions. The disclosure of related party transactions is suit investors' purpose in analyzing financial statement. However because only the amount for related party transactions is disclosed, outside investors can't figure out the content of transactions clearly and information asymmetry gets bigger. In this study, we examine the effect of related party transactions on information asymmetry. Because analysts are referred to as efficient users using firm-level data to develop a more accurate estimate of firm value, we use analyst forecast errors as a proxy for information asymmetry. In addition, we measure information asymmetry in the firms with a large proportion of foreign ownership. In the previous studies, foreign shareholders are considered as efficient observers. As foreign ownership increases, information asymmetry caused by related party transactions will be reduced. However, because investors have difficulty in understanding related party transactions abroad, information asymmetry will be increased in export-oriented firms. Using related party transaction data during 2002 through 2009, we find that related party transactions tend to increase information asymmetry between investors. Meanwhile the effect of related party transactions on analyst forecast errors decreases when firms have higher foreign ownership than others. This result suggest that foreign investors play a role in monitoring related party transactions and this reduces information asymmetry. Furthermore, in the firms with a large share of overseas sales, which is measured by the relative ratio of overseas sales to total sales, analyst forecast errors are increased by related party transactions. This suggests that related party transactions have different effects on the analyst forecast errors according to the characteristics of transactions and it is necessary to adjust the disclosure regulation of related party transactions.
- 발행기관:
- 한국경영학회
- 분류:
- 경영학