쌍방대리인 법정콘테스트와 성공보수

We explore whether delegates’ efforts can be secured, as clients desire, by contingent fees. For this, we set up a bilateral-delegation contest model, where delegates receive a fixed fee regardless of outcome, with a contingent fee receivable upon winning the case. We explore, in a two-stage game, how delegates’ effort levels and contingent fees are affected by the strategies of clients and delegates. Our results are as follows: First, in the second stage where the index of concentration is endogenous, their effort levels depend on whether delegates’ contingent fees are of equal size. Second, in the first stage, desired effort level can be secured by endogenized contingent fees of clients’ choice. Third, in the subgame-perfect equilibrium, by choosing contingent fees while paying no attention to their delegates' strategies, the clients can pay the optimal contingent fees which render delegates’ strategies futile. Herein, delegates' strategic behaviors turn into an 'incredible threat'.