황금낙하산 도입기업의 특성과 주주부에 미치는 영향

This paper examines the characteristics of companies and shareholder wealth effects which are associated with the adoption of golden parachutes. Golden parachutes are used as compensation mechanisms for managers as well as anti-takeover defenses. This paper tests for the motives for adopting golden parachutes. We conduct an event study to test whether the adoption of golden parachutes supports the incentive alignment hypothesis or the managerial entrenchment hypothesis. The market shows a mixed response to the event on the announcement date. Based on the cross-sectional analysis of the security market reaction and the analysis of ownership structure, we find the incidence of golden parachutes increases in firms where ownership is less concentrated. Also, negative market reaction to a firm's adoption of a golden parachute when internal ownership concentration is scarce points to entrenchment as the motive for adopting golden parachutes. The absence of external owners who can act as monitors increases the incidence of golden parachutes in firms, revealing that the motive for adopting golden parachutes stems from the moral hazard of managers. Firms that are vulnerable to hostile takeovers have an incentive to adopt golden parachutes as compensation mechanisms as well as managerial entrenchment tools. But, we do not find the motive for compensating managers in adopting golden parachutes, indicating that firms that are vulnerable to hostile takeovers are likely to adopt golden parachutes as a means of escaping the market discipline.