금융감독원 부패에 대한 책임과 정책의 방향

The Financial Supervisory Service(FSS) was established on January 2, 1999, under the Act on the Establishment of Financial Supervisory Organizations by bringing together four supervisory bodies-Banking Supervisory Authority, Securities Supervisory Board, Insurance Supervisory Board, and Non-bank Supervisory Authority-into a single supervisory organization. The primary function of the FSS is examination and supervision of financial institutions but can extend to other oversight and enforcement functions as charged by the Financial Services Commission (the former Financial Supervisory Commission) and the Securities and Futures Commission. In February, FSS suspended Busan Savings Bank and other savings banks, citing severe capital shortage. Busan Savings Bank raised the slush funds by offering illegal loans worth trillions of won to more than 100 special purpose companies established to invest in real estate and construction projects. The former chief of the FSS’s non-bank inspection bureau, Yoo received a total of 210 million won in bribes from the Busan Savings Bank in return for offering information and other favors. For example, Yoo had tipped the Bank off about information on inspections by the FSS and helped it prepare for them. More than 40 former current FSS officials have been called in for questioning with regard to the scandal so far. FSS became aware of illegal investments in a special purpose company(SPC) by Busan Savings Bank in June 2009, but no real measure were taken. The FSS launched an investigation into SPCs, but the investigation was kept under wraps. Follow-up measures from FSS came a year later in September 2010 and included no sanctions on Busan Savings Bank. As a result, South Korea’s financial authority urged banks to increase bad debt allowances. This crisis was generated and magnified due to the monopoly of policy making powers held by FSS together with the absence of institutional checks and balances. The reform was intended to turn the financial system to a regime based upon functional division of labor among various public agencies concerned. Financial supervisors should have a substantial degree of independence both from the government and industry in order to fulfill their mandate and contribute to the achievement and preservation of financial stability. In addition, considering the significant role of financial supervision, proper channels of accountability should be established to complement agency independence and make it work.