상호저축은행의 부동산 프로젝트 파이낸싱에 대한 소고

The number of real estate project financing (hereinafter, real estate PF) by Korean mutual savings banks (hereinafter, MS banks) has increased sharply since the mid 2000s. However, the considerable numbers of these real estate PFs by MS banks do not belong to the original concept of PF that is fundamentally long term and non-recourse financing. In numerous cases, MS banks have lent to developers in comparatively short-term basis in the early stage of construction, depending on the payment guarantees offered by the constructors. Such a loan is called as a bridge loan which is expected to exist until the offer of main loan is made. This paper analyzes why most MS banks joined herd behavior phenomenon in real estate PF despite of its high risk. Analysis shows complex reasons such as the concentrated ownership structure of MS banks, insufficient stable profit source, high debt ratio and high cash retention rate, difficulty of monitoring by minority shareholders in non-public MS banks, lack of monitoring incentive of deposit creditors, and so on. Based on the aforementioned analysis, some policies are suggested as follows: First, MS banks should develop their assessing ability to estimate the business value of potential borrowers’ projects. Moreover, they must lower their high debt ratio to heighten their franchise value. They also need to resort to adequate regulation to control the entry of competitors. To prevent the preference of risky asset by controlling shareholders, MS banks had better offer their stocks to the public. Lastly, the supervising authority must handle real estate recession in a conservative and anticipative manner.