기업지배구조가 연구개발활동의 시장평가에 미치는 영향

This paper investigates whether corporate governance affects the association between research and development(R&D) investments and firm's value. Based on the tenets of agency theory that self-serving managers may pursue corporate strategies for reasons other than to maximize shareholder value, this study proposes that the effect of R&D investments on a firm value is influenced by corporate governance systems. Specifically, it hypothesizes that a firm with a high level of corporate governance has a higher market valuation of R&D investments. I employ nine variables in three fields to measure corporate governance; board independence, board effectiveness, board duality, audit committee independence, audit committee effectiveness, audit committee specialty, ownership of directors, and ownership of the largest and special party concerned. Results show that R&D investments by firms with independent, effective, and specialized audit committee are related to higher market valuation. Implementing the audit committee is efficient in improving the quality of R&D investment decisions and communications of information, thus inducing the more positive association between R&D investments and firm's value. However, the results of this study do not provide support for the moderate effect of board of directors and shareholder's right. I expect that the findings of this study would provide the opportunity to lay emphasis on R&D investments and the role of audit committee that the capital market recognized. An extension of this study including more complete data to measure variables would induce more important implication for the effects of R&D investments on firm value.