직무위험의 이직 영향에서의 노조효과

This paper has two purposes that the first is to specify the model of collective voice critically and secondly estimate the union effect in the process job risks make effects to workers' quit intentions in the workplace. First, I am interested in the collective voice/institutional response model advanced by Freeman and Medoff (1984) but have found the model is simple and does not have enough the contents about the response, the other side of collective voice. So I add the notion of compensating wage differentials to the collective voice and some examples as the response like rievances and arbitration, seniority system, codetermination system in Germany. Next, I test the model of collective voice using the survey data. The three tests are estimations about the factors of the job risk determination, the factors of the wage determination, and the factors of the quit intention. In conclusion, the results say that partially the collective voice effect exists. Union effect the decrease of the job risks in the workplace through collective voice mechanism. Union effects the formation of compensating wage differentials against job risks. Unions effect the change of workers' quit intentions.