MBO거래의 법적 쟁점과 운용방안에 대한 연구

A MBO(management buyout) is a form of takeover where a company's existing directors acquire a large part or all of the company. MBOs are similar in all major legal aspects to any other acquisition of a company. The particular nature of the MBO lies in the position of the buyers as directors of the company, and the practical consequences that follow from that. Legal Issues especially relating to MBOs arise when the asymmetric information possessed by directors may offer them unfair advantage relative to current shareholders. The impending possibility of MBOs may lead to principal–agent problems, moral hazard, and perhaps even the subtle downward manipulation of the stock price prior to sale via adverse information disclosure. Since corporate valuation is often subject to considerable uncertainty and ambiguity, and since it can be heavily influenced by asymmetric or inside information, some question the validity of MBOs and consider them to potentially represent a form of insider trading. This article focus on the legal issues which arise surrounding structural conflict of interest of MBOs between the shareholder who sell its stock and director who acquire those stock, and then discuss its solution, operation methods in South Korea. We then provide a theoretical criteria for the use of MBOs as the appropriate standard for M&A. This article is organized in six parts. Part Ⅱ address the concept and function of MBOs and its nature of structural conflict of interests (Ⅱ. The Concept of MBOs and Its Structure of Conflict of Interest). Part Ⅲ we briefly review major country’s MBO regulations and cases (Ⅲ. Major Country’s MBO Regulations and Cases), and in part Ⅳ we review duty of directors who acquire stock of the company, and a standard of judgement on occupational breach of trust (Ⅳ. Duty of Care of on Directors, and Standard of Judgement on Occupational Breach of Trust).