시너지의 실행:계열사 간 자원공유의 활성화를 위한 기업본부의 선택적 개입

Unlike the prior research claiming that synergy is attained through centralization of decision making authorities, this study contends that centralization is not the only way to make SBUs cooperate. There are supposed to be diverse means if an SBU has more than one synergistic opportunity. The HQ has a choice of various intervention alternatives to create synergy and the efficacy of each alternative is contingent on the properties of the situation an SBU confronts. We argue that centralization is required if the source of synergy resides in the HQ and decentralization is required if it resides in an SBU. In addition, subjective performance evaluation is necessary if there is a conflict of interests in activating collaboration between the HQ and an SBU, but it is unnecessary if there is a coincidence between the two. We introduce an inter-SBU relatedness, an SBU’s competitive strategy, an SBU’s synergy-creating ability,and an SBU’s synergy-creating intention as four relevant situations and propose centralization,centralization and subjective performance evaluation, decentralization, and decentralization and subjective performance evaluation as four intervention modes suited for each situation. According to empirical results, the inter-SBU relatedness affects centralization and subjective performance evaluation in positive ways, whereas the competitive strategy affects neither centralization nor performance evaluation. The synergy-creating ability affects centralization in a negative way and subjective performance evaluation in a positive way. The synergy-creating intention affects centralization in a negative way, but it does not affect subjective performance evaluation. In sum, we suggest differentiated intervention modes suited for the synergistic situation of an SBU and confirm that seven of eight hypotheses are significantly supported. The primary contribution of this study is that we consider more than one synergistic situation and present the customized intervention modes for each of the situation. The prior research includes only inter-SBU relations and hence regards centralization as an single means to create synergy. We suggest and verify the hypotheses that centralization will be effective if an inter-SBU relatedness offers an synergistic opportunity, but centralization will be ineffective if an SBU has the superior ability or the affirmative intention to create synergy. The prior research exclusively focuses on centralization and underestimates the value of subjective performance evaluation as a means of synergy creation. The subjective performance evaluation has been presumed to be a redundant or auxiliary instrument, but there is a situation when neither centralization nor decentralization is valid. For instance, centralization itself will increase information processing costs if there is an inter-SBU relatedness and decentralization alone will increase agency costs if an SBU has a synergy-creating ability. In this case, the vulnerability of centralization or decentralization is complemented by subjective performance evaluation. In conclusion, this study is based on a contingent perspective that the HQ has several choices,the combinations of centralization and subjective performance evaluation, and the effectiveness of each choice is dependent on the synergistic situation.