감사위원회와 감사인의 세무서비스가 조세회피행위를 통하여 기업가치에 미치는 영향

Tax consequences are a motivating factor in many corporate decisions. Managerial actions designed to minimize corporate tax obligations are thought to be an increasingly important feature of corporate activity. In fact, corporate tax avoidance is costly on several margin. Aside from the direct cost of engaging in corporate tax avoidance activities, manager typically have to ensure that these actions are obscured from tax authorities. In the process, such machinations may afford managers increased latitude to pursue self-serving objectives. This research question is how investor value managerial actions to minimize corporate tax obligations. While the direct effect of tax avoidance is to increase the after-tax value of the firm, these effects are potentially offset by the increased opportunity of management for pursuing private benefit. Our empirical study shows that there is negative relation between the tax avoidance and firm value. In contrast, we found that tax avoidance in firms with the audit committee and auditor-provided tax services is positive significant relation with firm value. This findings indicate that managers of well-governed firms both the auditor committee and auditor-provided tax services faces more limited opportunities to engage in pursuing private benefit, so net effect on firm value should be far greater for firms well governance structure. In conclusion, the corporate tax avoidance cannot be simply interpreted as a transfer of resources from the tax authority to shareholders, in considering the agency problems characterizing shareholders- manager relations