대주주 지분이 타인자본비용에 미치는 영향 : 대주주-채권자 갈등의 효과를 중심으로

This paper examines how the relation between block ownership and cost of debt changes along with the firm characteristics. According to the results, increase in large individual shareholders’ ownership or the existence of foreign investors contributes to reducing the cost of debt in general, but in a firm with high leverage, low growth opportunities, or weak shareholder rights, such contribution is weakened or block ownership even leads to the higher cost of debt. High leverage or low growth opportunities can increase the conflict between the creditors, who hold senior fixed claim, and the blockholders, who hold a call option on the firm value. Weak protection of shareholder rights can increase conflict between the creditors, who are outside investors, and the blockholders, who are corporate insiders. The results provide the empirical evidence that in an average firm the effect of management monitoring by blockholders is dominant to enhance a firm’s capability to repay debt but in firms with above characteristics the creditors’ concern over the transfer of wealth from creditors to blockholders grows as the block ownership increases, so that the decrease of the cost of debt by blockholder ownership is weakened or blockholder ownership rather increases the cost of debt.