경영자 스톡옵션이 조세절감활동과 기업가치의 관련성에 미치는 영향

This paper analyzes how the tax sheltering by management affects firm value. It also investigates whether executive stock option influences the relationship between the tax sheltering by management and firm value. The samples for this study consist of companies listed on the Korea Stock Exchange from the year 2003 to 2007 during which we are able to collect book-tax-gap data. We define the tax sheltering by management as the amount among the book-tax income difference reported that cannot be explained with total accrual amount. We describe firm value as Tobin's Q and Market-to-Book ratio. We calculate the ratio of fair value of stock option compensation to management's total compensation amount using Black-Scholes Option Pricing Model. The study finds that the tax sheltering by the management has a negative effect on firm value. In addition, the analysis shows that the relation between tax sheltering and firm value is significantly positive for firms with the stock option plan. Furthermore, the result supports that the negative relation between tax sheltering and firm value is reversed to positive association when the ratio of fair value of stock option compensation to management's total compensation amount is high. These results imply that executive stock option is an important factor in using the economic benefits arising from the tax sheltering by the management as the benefit of the shareholders rather than the management itself.