자기차량담보손해와 차량가액의 분석을 통해 본 국내자동차보험시장의 도덕적 해이

This paper shows that there is a moral hazard phenomenon in your auto coverage by analyzing the relation between damage to your auto coverage and vehicle value in the Korean automobile insurance. First, it is presented through theoretical exposition that a rational agent does not subscribe to 'damage to your auto coverage' if there is no moral hazard and vehicle value is substantially low. However, those who possess a low-valued vehicle are frequently observed to subscribe to damage to your auto coverage in the data and this implies that incentive structure is distorted at the bottom tail of the vehicle value distribution. Ultimately, an evidence of moral hazard is unfold when a distorted incentive structure elicits distorted behavior of subscribers. Therefore, it is investigated in the empirical work whether those who possess a low-valued vehicle tend to have accident more frequently and, further, they tend to have more severe accident. Since we find out an evidence for moral hazard phenomenon, we conclude that damage to your auto coverage is highly susceptible to moral hazard and policy action may be needed to enhance market efficiency.