도드-프랭크법상 금융감독기구 개혁 및 입법적 시사점

Since the Korean government's announcement made in January 2012 that it would pursue legislation of the Financial Consumer Protection Act, there have been ongoing debates over which direction should be taken for reform of the current two-entity regulatory supervision system. Proponents of multi-entity regulatory supervision argue that Korea will never be immune from such huge financial crises as the sub-prime mortgage crisis in the USA; therefore, it is more desirable for the country to embrace a multi-entity regulatory supervision framework such as the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”) because it is believed to have contributed at the least to making the US financial services industry sounder and financial consumers safer and to be more effective in preventing such crises from taking place. After reviewing the Dodd-Frank Act, the author suggests that anyone who is involved in the financial services industry of Korea should invest more time and put more effort into reestablishing the right rationale and then decide on a financial regulatory supervision framework that is fairer, more effective, and more workable on a long term basis. Quick adaptation to changes in financial markets without closely analyzing their ramifications or simple adoption of a new financial regulatory supervision system of a foreign country without seriously studying its merits and demerits may incur unnecessary costs and reveal unknown loopholes in the regulation and supervision when it is put into practice. The United States has traditionally taken a multi-entity regulatory supervision approach and the Dodd-Frank Act is also an extension of this with the addition of a few new items. As it is influenced to a great deal by US law, Korea also adopted a multi-entity regulatory supervision system when it enacted a number of financial market related laws. As part of the efforts to tackle the financial crisis of 1987, the Korean government enacted later that year the Financial Services Commission Act under which five agencies – the Securities Supervisory Board, Bank, Inspection Board, Insurance Inspection Board, and Credit Management Fund - were consolidated into two entities – the Financial Services Commission and Financial Supervisory Service. The main reason behind this consolidation was the belief of the policy planners at that time that the previous sector-specific approach had left numerous loopholes in regulation unaddressed, and this had been one of the causes of the financial crisis of 1987; therefore, a more consolidated form of a regulatory supervision system such as Britain's Financial Services Authority was critical for removing those loopholes. As such, Korea now has experience in employing both a consolidated system and a multi-entity system; therefore, one may assume that by now both policy planners and industry experts in Korea should know by experience which of the two is better to apply to and to implement in the country's financial market for at least the next 50 years. In Part II, which reviews the significance of the Dodd-Frank Act in the history of financial industry reform of the United States, the author finds that the Dodd-Frank Act stays within Korea’s traditional financial regulatory supervision framework by showing almost identical characteristics. Part III examines the four new agencies that the Act gave birth to and discusses in which way the financial system of the United States was reformed. Part IV looks at the evaluation reports on the regulatory and supervisory agencies that the law created. In Part V the author makes a few suggestions for the financial regulatory and supervisory agencies of Korea in relation to the Dodd-Frank Act.