저축은행 부실화에 있어 대주주의 영향과 법적 규제

In the past one and a half year since January 2011, Financial Supervisory Commission(FSC) suspended 20 savings banks among the approximate 110 and targeted them for restructuring. Although this insolvency of savings bank was largely affected by the external factors like market condition, it was revealed that serious moral hazard of large shareholders was one of the most important causes. Mutual Savings Bank Act stipulates some measures to prevent this kind of moral hazard. For instance, unqualified large shareholders are not allowed to enter this business. In order to obtain licence for the business of savings bank, large shareholders need to meet legal requirements, and those who want to be a large shareholder by acquiring shares also need to obtain approval from FSC in advance with satisfying legal requirements. In addition, the Act also stipulates some measures to prevent large shareholders from making the savings bank their private safe or unfair deal with their controlling power. We find, however, that these measures are not effective in the real market as many illegal behaviors of the large shareholders connotes. Recently, some additional measures, such as examining process of maintaining eligibility for a large shareholder, were introduced, but we need more effective measures and policy to regulate large shareholders. This article suggests that the supervisory authority need more discretionary and practical power to evaluate the eligibility of large shareholder, and large savings bank comparable to bank need to be regulated by a more strict standard similar to that of bank regarding large shareholder and prudence.