THE PARADOX OF BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGE
THE PARADOX OF BOARD STRUCTURE CHANGE
김봉진(이화여자대학교)
15권 2호, 23~57쪽
초록
Drawing on both agency and stewardship theories, we examine the changes made to board structures in response to deregulation and the consequences of those observed changes on firm performance. We test the hypotheses using longitudinal data from the U.S. banking industry over the period 1981-1992, a noted era of deregulation. The results yield rather paradoxical outcomes. Changes in board structures appear to follow stewardship theory logic but firm performance is better among banks that appear to rely on agency theory logic. Finally, the results indicate that board equity ownership moderates the relationship between board structures and firm performance within the context of deregulation.
Abstract
Drawing on both agency and stewardship theories, we examine the changes made to board structures in response to deregulation and the consequences of those observed changes on firm performance. We test the hypotheses using longitudinal data from the U.S. banking industry over the period 1981-1992, a noted era of deregulation. The results yield rather paradoxical outcomes. Changes in board structures appear to follow stewardship theory logic but firm performance is better among banks that appear to rely on agency theory logic. Finally, the results indicate that board equity ownership moderates the relationship between board structures and firm performance within the context of deregulation.
- 발행기관:
- 한국전략경영학회
- 분류:
- 경영학