경영자 이익예측 공시 이후 재무분석가 예측수정의 특성

Management Forecasts are one of voluntary public information in capital market, which plays an affirmative role to reduce information asymmetry and improve the efficiency of market resource allocation (Diamond 1985; Verrecchia 2001). Analysts have a function to transfer and create information about firms in market. Prior research suggest that firms and analysts have mutually interrelated by sharing information about firms. However it has never been empirically investigated how analysts reflect the contents of management earnings forecasts in their revised forecasts. This paper examines what determines analysts' revision decision and how much analysts reflect management earnings forecast in their revised forecasts in Korean capital market for the sample period from 2000 to 2009. The empirical results are as follows. First, the likelihood of analysts' revision increases with analysts' reputation, brokerage size and the difference between management forecast and prior analyst forecasts. This result implies that the properties of management earnings forecasts and the characteristics of analysts affect the revision decision making of analysts. In terms of analysts, analysts make an high effort to maintain their reputation by utilizing the new public information, such as management forecasts. Also analysts, which work for big brokerage, are capable of lower their input for analyzing firms by taking advantage of information accessibility. Second, analysts reflect the difference between management forecasts and their prior earnings forecasts in their revised forecasts. Also, analysts who has the reputation have more tendency to reflect management earnings forecasts. Furthermore, when analysts forecasts error is bigger than management forecasts. Also the more accurate management forecasts are used to revise analysts earnings forecasts, which suggests that management forecasts improves the market efficiency and alleviate information asymmetry. However prior research has focused on analysts revision behaviors after management forecasts, assuming that analysts earnings forecasts are homogeneous. They report that analyst take advantage of management forecasts information, which implies that management forecasts improves the quality of analysts' earnings forecasts overall. Recently analysts forecasts are differentiated by analysts' individual characteristics variables, such as, analysts reputation, work complexity, and brokerage size (Clement 1999; Clement and Tse2005). They imply that analysts respond to new information. Therefore this study examines whether analysts are responsible to management forecasts and how much they reflect management forecasts to their revised forecasts heterogeneously by using individual analysts reports. This paper provides incremental contributions in suggesting the role of analysts characteristics and management forecasts properties. Also this paper extends literature linked to the properties of analysts revisions by presenting the empirical results that diverse and specific characteristics of analysts determine the revision decision after management forecasts. In conclusion, this paper helps understanding the decision making process of analysts regarding revision behavior.