대규모기업집단 소속기업과 자발적 공시：기업지배구조원의 공시점수를 중심으로

This study examines whether the unique characteristics of the firms that belong to the large business group affect the firms' disclosure practices. Specifically, we compare the disclosure practice of the firms that belong to the large business group (group firms) to that of the firms that do not belong to the large business group (non－group firms). The controlling shareholders of the group firms have longer investment horizons than other shareholders and the active involvement in firms' management results in lower information asymmetry between themselves and managers. This implies that the group firm's owner prefers less public voluntary disclosure (Chen et al. 2007). On the contrary, the controlling shareholders' concentrated and undiversified equity holdings are tied up in the firm's value. Thus, they are more likely to internalize both the benefits of disclosure and the costs of non－disclosure. This implies that the group firm's owner prefers more public disclosure(Chen et al. 2007). Empirical results suggest that the group firm's owner (should) disclose more than the non－group firm's owner. This implies that the controlling shareholders in Korea are likely to internalize the benefits of voluntary disclosure more and to mitigate the adverse image in the political and social status through the aggressive disclosures. Additionally, we find negative association between cash flow right and disclosure. This finding is consistent with the evidence that the larger the ownership is, the more controlling shareholders are unwilling to disclose firm's information to conceal the action of pursuing their private interest. However, we could not find significantly negative association between ownership wedge and disclosure.