미국 회사법상 적대적 M&A 상황에서의 강화된 경영판단의 원칙-델라웨어 州 회사법을 중심으로 -

The business judgment rule is a “presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interests of the company.”In the past, the board of directors at target merger and acquision (M&A) corporations have been recognized as being able to exercise the maximum M&A defense under the protection of the business judgment rule. However, since the mid 1980s, new rules began to be formulated under U.S. corporate law for directors in hostile M&A situations, particularly in Delaware. The “enhanced business judgment rule” was established over the general business judgment rule. Starting in 1985, notable precedents began to emerge from the State of Delaware and the Unocal, the Moran, and the Revlon cases, all of which were settled by 1986, accelerated the imposition of the revised rule. However, according to the author, the revised business judgment rule cannot be considered a business judgment rule for the following reasons:First, the enhanced business judgment rule changes the foundation of the business judgment rule because of the absence of presumption rule and the transition of the burden of proof. Second, the two rules are fundamentally different in that the business judgment rule considers the motive of the behavior while the enhanced business judgment rule also takes into account the extent of the behavior. Third, the enhanced business judgment rule is a strengthened version of the director’s fiduciary duty. In addition, the author believes that the enhanced business judgment rule is not really “enhanced” because of the following reasons:First, the burden of proof has been transferred to the board of directors through the transition of burden of proof, but the problem lies in the fact that it is actually easy to prove. Second, once the proof is easily obtained, the next step should be the implementation of the business judgment rule. Therefore, in practice, the enhanced business judgment rule does not really “enhance” the business judgment rule. As such, the enhanced business judgment rule cannot even be considered a business judgment rule, much less an “enhanced” one. The enhanced business judgment rule, however, can be an appropriate prototype for an ideal business judgment rule for the following reasons:First, it has the potential to be developed further as it places the burden of proof on the directors. Second, it is possible to increase the responsibility of the directors by assessing their behavior. Third, it may be possible to strengthen duty of loyalty, which has often been overlooked in the existing business judgment rule due to “reasonableness” factor and the imposition of duty as an “auctioneer.”