The Impact of Constitutional Reforms on the Elite’s Political Behavior: A Comparative Case Study of Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, and Malawi

Most of the literature on the regulatory policies especially in Sub-Saharan Africa focus on the behavior of the masses, for example, alcohol consumption, use of forest products, pollution, and demonstrations. However, the regulation of the elite’s political behavior is one of the least analyzed phenomena in the region, yet it concerns use of government power, public administration machinery, as well as the determination of public access to basic needs, resources, opportunities, information, technology, administrative action, fairness, and justice. Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the regions with a strong history of bad governance. Most of the countries in these region have a colonial legacy, along with inherited colonial political behavior entrenched in the systems of governance. Countries like Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, and Malawi have since 1990s conducted fundamental constitutional reforms, seeking to address these issues. Therefore, this paper seeks to answer the questions: (i) What is the impact of the constitutional reforms on the elite’s political behavior in Kenya, South Africa, Ghana, Rwanda, and Malawi?, (ii) What factors can be counted responsible for this impact and its sustainability? This is a conceptual paper based on an integrated model built on the basic tenets of game theory, window of opportunity, and contextual realities. Based on the evidences from these countries, the paper suggest that regulatory policies and strategies directed to the elite’s political behavior have far reaching implications on economic development of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.