의료법인의 영(0)에 근접한 이익조정현상에 관한 연구

This study investigates whether characteristics of Korean hospital industry influence the behavior of earnings management for near zero income reporting. Generally speaking, characteristics of Korean are as follows; First, hospitals have incentives to decrease their reported income or meet near zero in order to enhance the bargaining power in the process of pricing medicare price and/or cost. Second, hospitals have also incentives to decrease or meet their reported income level at around near because medical industry is regulated by government. Especially, this phenomenon conspicuously occurs at lager size of hospital. Third, compensation scheme may differ according to ownership or owner type. Civil owned hospitals may implement the performance based compensation system other than government owned hospitals. So, managers of civil hospital have intent to increase reported income or meet around zero. Finally, hospitals' revenue may be from external donation. These Donor can monitor hospitals' performance, and then make a decision about additional donation. Thus, hospital managers have incentives to increase reported income or meet near zero. In above characteristic, there is two different perspectives about sign of earnings management, positive and negative reported income. we develops four hypothesis regarding relationship between incentives and earnings management for meeting reporting income level to around zero. Offsets may occur from interaction between both sign of earnings management such as increasing or decreasing reported income. Thus, the extent of earnings management, as like reported income level, may be near(around) zero. This study executes logistic regression of profit-avoidance dummy, loss-avoidance dummy and near-zero dummy, measured by methodology of Burgstahler and Dichev(1997), on ratio of insurance revenue to total revenue, size, civil hospital dummy and ration of donation revenue to total revenue. And research samples consist of 616 hospital-year, selected from disclosure system of Korean National Tax Service. The results of this study are as follows. First, there is statistically significant positive relationship between Near-Zero and ratio of insurance revenue and between Profit-Avoid and this ratio. Thus, it is verified that hospitals manage their reported income around zero or avoid profit(positive income) in order to obtain bargaining power against government. Second, size of hospitals has also significantly positive coefficient with Near-Zero and Profit-Avoid.. This results say that large size of hospital tend to avoid profit or meet their income level near zero, in oder to decrease or mitigate political costs. Third, there is statistically significant positive relationship between Near-Zero and civil owned hospital, and also between Loss-Avoid and civil hospital. So, it can be explained that managers of civil hospital rather than governmental hospital have incentives to manage earnings for loss avoidance or meet around zero in order to increase their compensation as they show their performance. Finally, donation ratio has significantly negative coefficient with Near-Zero in contrast with our expectation. Thus, it says that hospitals is likely to manage earnings for far from zero in order to maintain or increase the donors by reporting bad performance to them. This study has implications to practitioners, academics and related authority on accounting of Nonprofit organization. In addition, This study makes contributions to several lines of existing research on earnings management as well.