카르텔의 자진신고에 의한 책임감경제도와 손해배상청구소송의 상호관계에 대한 연구

The leniency program is a device for detection and deterrence of cartel. However, private claims for damages suffered from cartel have an impact on the effectiveness of the leniency program. There is often the concern that the incentive of the leniency program would not be sufficient enough to induce voluntary reports of cartel if the leniency applicant is confronted with extensive private follow-on claims for compensation. In that regard, this paper focuses on two important aspects: First, it takes into account whether the cooperation of a leniency applicant is able to reduce the potential level of damages the applicant has to pay as the defendant of private follow-on claims. Second, it considers the point that leniency applicants should not be disadvantaged by extensive pre-trial discovery, which may be used directly as source of evidence against the leniency applicant in the private follow-on claims under the current the U.S. legal system. By comparing leniency programs and relevant damages claims of the U.S., EU, and Japan as well as reviewing statistical studies and surveys, this paper not only addresses the aspects mentioned above but also considers the rights of compensation of the aggrieved parties that suffer damages by cartel. Ultimately, this paper concludes that we should not hastily arrange special provisions aimed to reduce the level of damages. This claim rests on the fact that unlike the legal system of the United States, our legal system does not approve treble or punitive damages; thus, measures such as the special provision in the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and Reform Act of the U.S. that are intended to reduce the severity of treble or punitive damages may excessively protect the cartel from the victims of cartel under our legal system. As to the confidentiality of the leniency applications, this paper suggests that we must prudently construe our relevant provisions in antitrust and civil procedure laws by weighing and balancing the interests of the aggrieved parties against the necessity of effective cartel prosecution. A thorough analysis of the U.S. leniency system will also be essential to the effectiveness of our leniency program.