미국사법부의 행정청 법률해석에 대한 사법적 존중에 관한 연구 ― Chevron 독트린과 그 적용범위를 중심으로 ―

This article focuses on the judicial review of agency statutory interpretation by analyzing on the U.S. supreme court’s cases and circuit court’s cases. The scope of judicial review of administrative construction is one of the most important issues in administrative law. The question of the scope of judicial review is a typical problem of public law. Prior to the judicial review of agency decision, there is usually a statutory interpretation of administrative body. In contrast to the judicial review of agency decision, civil or criminal law cases begin without a state-run decision because these courts have to judge the behavior of private persons. In Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme Court held that if it determines Congeress has not addressed the question at issue, “the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.” Summarized in a simple formula, one can say that civil and criminal court decide, while administrative and constitutional courts control the agency action. In general so-called, this U.S. Supreme Court position on the judicial review of agency interpretation make the appearance of Droit Administratif in the U.S. legal system. Prior to Chevron, judicial review of agency constructions of the statute they implement was characterized by pervasive inconsistency and unpredictability. Two cases decided in 1944 illustrate the problem. In NLRB v. Hearst Publications, a five-Justice majority criticized a circuit court for ignoring the NLRB’s construction of the term employee, as that term is used in the NLRA and for instead drawing on definitions of the term adopted by court for use in other contexts like tort law and tax law. The Court upheld the agency’s construction of the term and instructed reviewing courts to upheld an agency construction of agency-administered statute if it has “a reasonable basis in Law.” However, during the same term, a six-Justice majority did just what the Hearst majority criticized the circuit court for doing. For decades the Court flip-flopped between those diametrically opposed approaches to interpretation of agency-administered statutes, with no explanation of why it used one approach in some cases and the opposite approach in other cases. To confuse the matter still further, the Court announced yet a third standard for reviewing agency construction of agency-administered statutes in its 1944 opinion in Skidmore v. Swift&Co. The Court announced a new approach to judicial review of agency statutory constructions in its landmark 1984 opinion in Chevron cases. The conclusion of that cases summarize the highly deferential judicial review of agency construction. The Court recognized that giving meaning to an ambiguous term in a statute is a policy decision rather than a legal decision. As such, it should be made by a politically accountable institution. In other words, agencies, rather than courts, should interpret ambiguous provisions in agency-administered statutes because that interpretative task actually constitutes policy-making, and policy-making should be undertaken by politically accountable agencies rather than politically unaccountable courts. Under Chevron, a court’s role is limited to:(1) determining whether the statute is clear or ambiguous with respect to the issue raised, and(2) determining whether the agency policy decision implicit in the construction adopted by the agency is permissible. A Scholarly author called that Chevron Court test the Chevron two steps. This highly deferential test requires a court to upheld any reasonable agency construction of an ambiguous agency-administered statute. Chevron deference does not apply to all agency interpretations of agency-administerd statutes. It clearly applies to interpretations adopted in notice and comment rulemakings and formal adjudications. Beyond that, it is difficult to generalize. In U.S. v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court acknowledged that “we have sometimes found reasons for Chevron deference even when no such formality was required and none was afforded,” but it has not described the less formal circumstances in which Chevron deference is appropriate except by reference to one situation in which it concluded that Chevron deference was not appropriate. If Chevron deference does not apply to an agency interpretation, the much weaker form of deference described in Skidmore does. Chevron applies to jurisdictional issues and only to agency-administered statutes. Chevron deference is not due an agency that has only adjudicatory responsibility and does not apply to statutes implemented by multiple agencies. Chevron does not apply to state agency constructions and agency interpretations of judicial opinions. Chevron applies to the all federal courts and to the IRS. Supreme Court precedents trump Chevron but Chevron trumps circuit precedents.