중국 부동산 정책에 관한 정치경제학적 분석: 중앙과 지방의 권력관계를 중심으로

The purpose of this study is to explain China's real estate profit and distribution conflicts. This thesis raises two interrelated questions: What conflicts are there in Chinese real estate market? What power relations have been formed between central and local government? Many studies have noted that conflicts over profit distribution and the forceful expropriation of land by developers, that are virtually local government’s subsidiaries, are key sources of the rising social unrest in China. A few economists also point out that liberalization of the real estate market since 1998 is an increasingly important factor of the deepening economic inequality in Chinese society. Nevertheless, few have ever investigated the role of the booming real estate market in the newly evolving relationship between central and local government, especially after the 1994 fiscal reform. Obviously, the central government, or the CCP leadership, and local government have fundamentally different politico-economic interests that are mutually contradictory in many occasions. Through the fiscal reform, real estate finance was incorporated under the jurisdiction of the local government. However, the Central government indirectly controls the local government through financial and personal means. Especially, the central government has begun to recognize the seriousness of the overheated real estate market since 2003. These relations between central and local government can best be represented by the history of real estate policies. Although the impact of conflicts has not been brought to light yet, it carries with it the possible danger of wreaking havoc in the community. In the long term, it will be one of the risk factors for the communist regime in China. Overall, the purpose of this study is to analyze the pattern of policies in order to delineate the structure of varied interests between central and local government.