최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과: 이사회와 재벌의 조절효과
The CEO hubris and firm performance: The moderating role of board independence and chaebol affiliation
박종훈(서강대학교); 성연달(서강대학교); 김창수(서강대학교)
42권 3호, 673~697쪽
초록
본 논문의 목적은 선행연구에서 제시되었던 최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과 간의 부의 관계를 확인하고, 이들 관계가 경영자 통제 상황에 따라 어떻게 달라지는가를 연구하는 것이다. 최고경영자 자기과신(CEO hubris)은 전략적 의사결정과정에서 오류를 발생시킬 수 있으며, 이는 결과적으로 저조한 기업성과로 이어질 수 있다. 그러나 이와 같은 관계의 강도는 경영자가 어떻게 통제되고 있는가에 따라 달라질 수 있다. 경영자 통제가 강할 때 최고경영자 자기과신이 기업성과에 미치는 영향이 감소할 수 있으며, 반대로 통제가 약할 때는 그 영향이 증대될 수 있다. 이는 조직 내외부의 경영자 감시 및 통제기제가 작동할 때 최고경영자 자기과신이 기업의 실제적 의사결정으로 이어질 가능성이 감소하기 때문이다. 이에 본 연구는 한국 기업환경에서 경영자 통제기제로 이사회와 재벌을 제시하고, 이러한 통제기제들이 최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과 간의 관계에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 분석결과, 최고경영자 자기과신과 기업성과 간의 관계는 부의 관계가 확인되었으며, 이러한 부의 관계는 이사회의 독립성이 높거나 기업이 재벌에 속해 있는 경우 감소하였다. 본 연구결과는 최고경영자에 대한 통제기제가 잘 갖추어져 있는 경우 최고경영자의 인지적 편향성이 기업에 미치는 부정적인 효과가 줄어들 수 있음을 시사한다.
Abstract
This study examines the moderating role of the management control mechanisms in Korea, involving board and chaebol, in the relationship between CEO hubris and firm performance. This study begins with the negative effect of CEO hubris on firm performance. It is argued that hubris-infected CEOs are likely to become overconfident and committed to the risky and problematic decision-making, resulting in poor firm performance. Hypothesis 1: CEO hubris is negatively associated with firm performance. If CEO hubris is associated with poor firm performance, then what factors can alleviate or exacerbate its performance consequence? Faced with the inherent principal-agent problem, weak board independence may allow agency problems. Moreover, the inherent agency problems may be amplified by the other problem associated with CEO hubris. Circumstances exist, however, that may promote board independence in reducing agency problems. We focus on two circumstances of strong board independence: a high proportion of outsiders on the board and the separation of the CEO and chair positions. We argue that CEO hubris is in check when the outside directors are prevalent in a board, potentially restraining the negative consequence that the CEO hubris might engender. It is also critical to separate the CEO and chair positions by means of ensuring board independence. We argue that, when the board chair and CEO positions are separated, CEOs may have less incentive and discretion to enable their hubris to drive the firm in their managerial interests. Hypothesis 2a: The higher the outside director ratio in a board, the weaker the relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance. Hypothesis 2b: The relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance will be weaker in the case of the separated CEO and chair positions. In Korea, large family-run, diversified business groups, termed chaebols, dominate the economy. In general, a strong group control on personnel decisions limits the discretions of CEOs in individual affiliates under chaebol. In other words, chaebol group headquarters play the role of monitoring and controlling CEOs of group affiliated firms. Therefore, it is argued that the agency problems arising from hubris-infected CEOs will be less of a concern when the firm belongs to chaebol. Hypothesis 3: The relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance will be weaker in the case of chaebol firms as opposed to non-chaebol firms. Using data from the Korean public firms of 2004 and 2005, we found that both board independence and chaebol affiliation weaken the relationship between CEO hubris and poor firm performance. These findings draw attention to the negative consequence of CEO hubris and the mitigating role of board independence and chaebol affiliation. Our study offers a practical implication that the unhealthy influence of CEO hubris on firm performance can be checked and balanced by a group control mechanism, as well as an independent board.
- 발행기관:
- 한국경영학회
- 분류:
- 경영학