헌법개정에 있어서 의원내각제와 대통령제에 관한 제도분석

Constitutions are themselves institutions that result from a series of collective decision-making processes and motivate other forms of collective actions. The primary objectives of constitutions is to establish the legitimate foundations of governmental powers, to allocate those powers among the specific organs of government that the constitution creates or recognizes, and to provide a road map for the development of positive law and policy, including instructions for constitutional change. I am concerned with some issues in this paper as following:First, I am going to review how to run the existing presidential institution as an imperial presidency, and at the same time, representatives raise a problem of agency costs by elected president and parliament whose preferences or self interests potentially diverge from those of their constituencies. The Choice in many countries between presidential system and parliamentary system can be relied upon by the check and balance of powers and a consensual democracy and a majority democracy. Second, I will deal explicitly with their reason and side-effects how the divided government did emerged under existed presidential system which has been resulted from the presidential election of a zero-sum game. The divided government on the basis of the presidential government of executive supremacy has been politically quarreled by the ins and outs. We can take into consideration of holding the direct democracy as a plebiscite and people's initiatives which is going to decrease an agency costs of both president and parliament and to prevent the political collisions between the ins and the outs under the divided government. Third, we can review how the constitution of parliamentary government can apply the rule of check and balance between the ins and the outs. In particular, that parliamentary system may guarantee the right to dissolve of the House of Representatives which can reconcile from their collisions between the ins and the outs, and I am going to examine the more effective selection criteria between presidential system and parliamentary system. In short, we have to review some issues as follows: why we have to change the presidential government through the Constitution's Amendment soon? I do raise both the genuine presidency and parliamentary government as the perspectives of Constitution's amendment, and refer to the public choice's implication of economic analysis of the representative democracy in Korean constitutional political history.