경영자 이익예측과 4분기의 이익조정

This paper examines the relationship between management earnings forecast and earnings management in the fourth quarter. We identify that firms with earnings forecast disclosure tend to increase or decrease the fourth quarter earnings for meeting their earnings forecast. When a firm faces poor performance during the first three quarters, it has incentives for inflating fourth-quarter earnings at a target level. We hypothesize that a firm performing poorly in the first three quarters may attempt to increase earnings of the fourth quarter to achieve a desired annual earnings target, while a firm performing well in the first three quarters may attempt to decrease earnings of the fourth quarter to reserve earnings for the future. To test the hypothesis, The sample consists of 2,592 firm-fourth quarters with non- banking firms and December fiscal year traded over Korea Stock Exchange(KSE) during 2003~2008. We classify sample firms into two groups based on management earnings forecast. the sample firms are divided on the basis of whether they voluntarily disclose earnings forecast. The firms with earnings forecast disclosure are further classified into two groups. One group is that earnings in the first three quarters exceed management earnings forecast of the same year. the other group is not to meet management earnings forecast. Our results show that the firms with earnings forecast disclosure have higher the mean of absolute discretionary accruals than the control firms(non-disclosure) in the fourth quarter. Also, the result of regression analysis shows that the firms disclosing earnings forecast tend to increase absolute discretionary accruals. These results imply that managers with earnings forecast disclosure have an incentive to actively manage the fourth quarter earnings for their reliability. In the sample with earnings forecast, we suggest that the firms are more likely to increase the fourth quarter earnings when the difference between annual earnings forecast and earnings in the first three quarters is great. These results provide that the firms that fail to achieve earnings forecast manage earnings upward and the firms that exceed earnings forecast manage earnings downward in the fourth quarter. By using quarterly data, this paper has several advantages in detecting earnings management on management earnings forecast. Quarterly data provides a sharper focus on the forecast disclosure, which could increase the likelihood of detecting earnings management. Also, financial statements for interim quarters are often unaudited, allowing greater managerial discretion and requiring less detailed disclosure than annual financial statements. These differences provide managers with greater opportunities to manage earnings and, hence, make detection of earnings management more likely in interim quarters.