대주주관련 부정적 사건이 외국인 투자자의 지분율과 기업가치에 미치는 영향

This paper investigates how negative news on a firm's controlling shareholders-resulting from agency problem- affects the foreign investors position and the firm values. Specifically, the study examines the changes in foreign ownership and abnormal returns for the firm in the aftermath of negative news (slush funds, embezzlement, illegal transfer, unfair transaction, etc.) on controlling shareholders of 431 publicly listed manufacturing firms in the nine-year period of 2000 to 2008. Empirical results show that foreign ownership gradually decreases before the release of negative news (event date). Foreign ownership, however, increases gradually afterward. This finding suggests that foreign investors were informed of the poor corporate governance and reacted by selling the shares of the firms with poor governance. On the other hand, the increase of foreign ownership after the news release may reflect foreign investors' expectation for improvement in the governance of the firm. The results concerning abnormal returns after the event date are twofold: abnormal return decreases in the short term but it reverts to normal level in the long term. The empirical results suggest that foreign investors prefer investing in firms with sound corporate governance.