기업의 재무적 제약이 현금의 한계가치에 미치는 영향

In this paper, we analyze empirically the effects of financial constraints on the marginal value of cash of firms listed on Korea Exchange. The main results of this study can be summarized as follows. Stockholders place less than the full value on the cash of firms that hold excess cash. because they evaluate the cash held by the firm at its after-stockholder-tax value. As firm's cash level increases, its marginal value of cash decreases. This means that stockholders place a lower marginal value on the cash of firms that hold excess cash at the expense of stockholders. Moreover, this result implies that capital market penalizes firms that hold excess cash at the expense of stockholders, because excess cash holdings of firms destroy stockholder value. As firm's leverage increases, its marginal value of cash decreases. This means that stockholders place a lower marginal value on the cash of highly leveraged firms than on the cash of lowly leveraged firms. Stockholders place a higher marginal value on the cash of firms that predominantly distribute earnings to stockholders in the form of stock repurchases rather than cash dividends, because dividend tax rate is normally higher than capital gains tax rate applied to stock repurchases. The estimated marginal value of cash for financially constrained firms such as unaccessibility firms and low credit rating ones is significantly higher than the estimated marginal value of cash for financially unconstrained firms such as accessibility firms and high credit rating ones, controlling for the interaction variables among the level of cash, the level of leverage, stock repurchase ratio, and the change of cash. So to speak, the marginal value of cash is more valuable for stockholders of financially constrained firms than financially unconstrained ones. This means that stockholders place a higher marginal value on the cash of financially constrained firms against financially unconstrained ones, because the former have lower accessibility to capital market than the latter. In conclusion, stockholders place a lower marginal value of cash for firms that hold excess cash and higher leverage at the expense of stockholders, but they place a higher marginal value of cash for firms that distribute earnings to stockholders in the form of stock repurchases rather than cash dividends. Moreover, stockholders place a lower marginal value of cash for financially constrained firms than financially unconstrained ones. These results imply that the capital market penalizes firms that hold excess cash and higher leverage at the expense of stockholders, and are consistent with agency theory that firms with excess cash and higher leverage can destroy stockholder value. More importantly, financial constraints have significant effect on the marginal value of cash.