Why Firms Voluntarily Switch Their Auditors? Public and Private Firms

The distinctively different characteristics in public and private firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Kim and Bae 2008) can provide different causes to switch their auditors because client firms characteristics can significantly influence auditor-switching (Stefaniak et al. 2009). In this study, we investigate and compare the causes of auditor-switching in public and private firms. Similar to prior research, we define the causes of auditor-switching as a modified audit opinion (Chow and Rice 1982), client firm size (Francis and Wilson 1988), audit tenure (Myers et al. 2003), audit fees (Johnson and Lys 1990), and financial distress (Schwartz 1982). We find that the causes of auditor-switching in public firms are different from private firms. Based on logit regression for the period from 2006 to 2009, the results show that leverage would play a positive and significant role in switching auditors than retaining auditors in public firms and a modified opinion and financial distress would play a positive and significant role in switching auditors than retaining auditors in private firms. In addition, the results demonstrate that firm size and good financial performances are more likely to play a negative and significant role in switching auditors in public firms, whereas audit tenure is negative and significant role in switching auditors in private firms. We find consistent results that the causes of auditor-switching decision in public firms are different from private firms.