이사회 독립성에 영향을 미치는 사외이사후보추천위원회 특성에 대한 연구

This study investigates the relationship between the characteristics which influence the monitoring incentive of nominating committee for managers and the independence of board of directors. We select the 7 characteristics of nominating committee that influence it's monitoring incentive for managers, and also classify 7 characteristics as 3 factors using factor analysis. Then, we use the proxies for independence of board as the ratio of outside directors to the total board members and a indicator variable which explains whether the number of outside directors exceed a half of the number of board members. Using a sample of 94 non-financing companies voluntarily forming nominating committees that are listed in Korean security market for the period 2001-2009, we empirically examine the impact of nominating committee's characteristics on the independence of the board. We find that the independence of nominating committee is positively associated with the proportion of the independent directors on the board of directors and the majority dummy of board members. Also, we uncover that the entrenchment of nominating committee is negatively related with the ratio of the independent directors on the board and the majority dummy of board members. These empirical results imply that nominating committees with higher independence or lower entrenchment are more likely to form independent board of directors to effectively monitor management.