기업 현금 보유수준과 노동조합의 교섭력과의 관계 연구

This paper empirically investigates whether firm manager use strategically firm’s cashholdings in collective bargaining with labor unions. Based on theory of collective bargainingwith labor union, managers have an incentive to use strategically cash holdings in collectivebargaining with labor unions. Thus I provide the evidence that firms in more unionizedindustries or firms strategically hold less cash to gain bargaining advantages over labor unionsand also they have an incentive to shelter corporate income from labor union demands. Thatis, it shows that corporate cash holdings are negatively and significantly related with laborunions. The empirical results are as follows. First, I find the evidence that unionized firms aremore likely to hold less cash holdings rather than non-unionized firms and the differencebetween two groups is significant. Second, based on proportion of labor union to totalemployees, five portfolios are constructed to find the difference between low and highunionized firms. It documents that high unionized firms have less cash holdings rather lowunionized firms. This evidence implies that managers use strategically cash holding incollective bargaining with labor unions. Third, from regression analysis, it finds that collectivebargaining power is negatively related to cash holdings, implying that it is the evidence inusing cash holding for bargaining with labor. Additionally It provides same result aftercontrolling for various proxies for collective bargaining and several characteristic variables.