한국기업의 사외이사 임면의 공시효과: 기업지배구조에 따른 차별화

This study examines whether there is any difference in the stock price impact of theappointment or dismissal of outside directors for Korean firms depending on the quality ofcorporate governance structure. Using the event study and t-test methods, we found severalinteresting empirical results as follows. First, the appointment effect of outside directors on stock prices was negative just until afew days after the event date, but afterwards stock prices rebounded. The appointment ofnew directors has no significant effect on stock prices, but the reappointment of old directshas a significantly positive effect. Second, the announcement effect was differential depending upon the quality of corporategovernance structure. So, the effect was significantly negative for Korean firms with inferiorgovernance structure. Third, the dismissal effect of outside directors on stock prices was not significant, and theregular dismissal had no impact, either. However, the dismissal during the term of officenegatively affected stock prices. In particular, firms with poorer corporate governanceshowed much larger drop in stock prices, possibly due to the information asymmetry problem. To conclude, Korean firms with inferior corporate governance have faced negative stock price impacts from both appointment and dismissal of outside directors. Therefore, it implies that they should take preemptive measures to improve corporate governance structure. In addition, firms with sound corporate governance should also retain independent outside directors in consecutive terms.