재무분석가의 이익예측활동이 자발적 공시에 미치는 영향

This study investigates the effect of number of financial analysts following on managers' voluntary disclosure behavior. We also attempt to study role of analysts following in Korean Stock Market. In particular, this paper examines that whether more analysts following lead to management's earnings forecast disclosure, and that how the analysts following affects true disclosure versus false disclosure, the errors in management's earnings forecasts. The empirical results are summarized as follows. First, consistent with expectation, as the number of analysts following increases, the firms have more incentives to disclosure management's earnings forecasts. Second, the firms followed by more financial analysts tend to be more true disclosure. Finally, the difference between management's earnings forecasts and reported actual earnings by firms (i.e., the error of earnings forecast) increases significantly with the number of analysts following. This study contributes to the literature on analysts following in three ways. First, we document that financial analysts following do play a role as an effective external monitors to induce managers' voluntary disclosure. Second, we find that there exist significant positive association between the number of analysts following and managers' true disclosure behavior. However, this study also provides evidence that, analysts following play the role of excessive market pressure on managers to disclosure optimistic earnings forecasts.