기관투자자 의결권 반대행사의 경영진 견제효과

This paper studied the shareholder activism of institutional investors who had opposedfirms’proposal in a shareholder meeting for the period from 2005 to 2011. We analyzedhow the stock price of a target firm would be changed by the no vote of institutionalinvestors. The results are as follows: Institutional investors’ votes against a firm’s proposalgenerally resulted in the market’s positive reaction to the target firm’s stock price. Thesefindings coincide with the institutional investors’ monitoring hypothesis. The positive marketreaction is stronger as the proportion of the no vote items to total items increases. The positive market reaction is greater when the no vote on a proposal is rejected at ageneral meeting of shareholders. The monitoring hypothesis is confirmed by the regressionanalysis with cumulative abnormal returns on the occasion of shareholder meetings. Theinstitutional investors’ no vote, thus, functions well as one of the external governance structureand need to attract active exercise of institutional investors’ vote. For this, we needto extend the notice for convocation of meeting of shareholders, to make full use of thevarious channel of notifying item, to utilize a guideline for exercising the right to vote,and to be supported by a shareholder advisory firm or proxy advisory services.