외국인투자자의 투자기간이 조세회피에 미치는 영향

This paper investigates the effect of an investment horizon of foreign investors on tax avoidance. Previous literatures, which were based on the ownership of foreign investors, argue that foreign investors play a role of surveillant and that their monitoring will affect firm value and information asymmetry between investors and firm. This means that monitoring costs decrease with the length of time invested in the firm and monitoring benefits increase with it. So, tax avoidance will be decrease as the length of time invested by foreign investors increase. The samples of this study were selected from listed corporations, consisting of 2,409 firm-year observations collected during the years of 2008 to 2012. Tax avoidance measured by the method of Desai and Dharmapala(2006) and investment horizon of foreign investors measured by the method of Sungmin Kim and Yongwon Jang(2012), which is an improved version of Gasper et al(2005)'s method. In logit analysis, this study has found that the higher the foreign investor’s turnover ratio, the greater the probability of it being categorized into the group with higher tax avoidance level. In multiple regression analysis, this study has found that foreign investors' turnover ratio of investment has significant positive relationship with tax avoidance. This means that the longer investment horizon of foreign investors, the lower the level of tax avoidance. These findings support the hypothesis that long term foreign investors can reduce tax avoidance by the virtue of monitoring role effect.