대규모기업집단의 감사인 동일화가 경영자 예측정보의 편의성 및 정확성에 미치는 영향

This study examines the effect of the same auditor appointment on the management forecasts' bias and accuracy in a large business group. The management forecasts mitigate information asymmetric between the management and the stakeholder, and it also reduce the cost of acquiring information funded by investors to convey firm’s insider information to the market. However, we are not always able to provide reliable information since the managements' voluntary disclosure is involved in the economic incentives. So we assume the amount of the economic incentives as a degree of audit quality for the same auditor appointment in the large business group. We obtained the information on the forecasts of 220 firm-years released by the large business group listed in the Korea Stock Exchange over the period between 2008 and 2012. The result of the empirical study shows that the same auditor appointment for the large business group tend to make the sales forecasts less accurate and more biased. The result is consistent with the auditor entrenchment hypothesis. The fact implies that the "same auditor appointment" is not able to monitor the managements' exercise on their own discretion displayed on the financial statements. The managements tend to overestimate or misunderstand the capability of their firms. Our findings should also be useful for the investors who use the information on the managements forecasts and provide directions for the auditors when auditing for the firms.